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Abstract
Post-conf lict societies are in a fragile state in which social cohesion needs 
to be gradually rebuilt. One of the tools employed to restore social cohesion 
in a fragile society is the organisation of a national dialogue which would 
allow most, if not all, of society’s political and civil society actors to air 
their grievances and make concrete recommendations for the long-lasting 
resolution of conf lict. In the MENA region, both Tunisia and Yemen have 
organised national dialogues after the Arab Spring with different results. 
This article uses Jane Jenson’s model on social cohesion to determine why 
Tunisia’s national dialogue has been more successful than Yemen’s in 
bringing about social cohesion. 
Keywords: Social cohesion, national dialogues, transitions, peacebuilding, 
Tunisia, Yemen
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In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, two countries, 
Tunisia and Yemen, have completed national dialogues in the wake of 
their Arab Spring revolutions. Although Tunisia and Yemen differ in 
terms of historical experience, socio-economic development and political 
structure, the two countries have in the past four years shared very 
similar experiences, having emerged from prolonged dictatorships quasi 
simultaneously by overthrowing their respective dictators through people-
powered revolutions, and subsequently initiated national dialogues to 
unite their divided societies. 
Tunisia and Yemen are the first countries in the region to undertake 
national dialogues, and this article is interested in comparing these two 
countries’ experiences to draw lessons learned for other countries in the 
region and further afield. Although both countries spent a great deal 
of time and resources to ensure the success of their national dialogues, 
they have had very different outcomes, with Tunisia emerging from the 
process with a more cohesive society, and Yemen reaping only conf lict and 
instability. Within the same greater region, how did one country’s social 
cohesion efforts succeed while the other’s are generally considered to have 
failed? To answer this question, this article will use the model on social 
cohesion developed by Jane Jenson (1998), one of the earliest and most 
widely cited works on social cohesion. In this model, Jenson identifies five 
key components of social cohesion: Belonging, Inclusion, Participation, 
Recognition and Legitimacy. Jenson argues that these components 
must exist in a society for it to be cohesive. This article will employ the 
theoretical framework of Jenson’s model to ask: have Tunisia and Yemen’s 
national dialogues created conducive environments for social cohesion? 
Framing the question within this theoretical framework will highlight 
why Tunisia’s efforts were more successful than Yemen’s, as systematically, 
the national dialogue in Tunisia fostered a sense of Belonging, Inclusion, 
Participation, Recognition and Legitimacy, while Yemen’s did not. This 
article will firstly lay out its theoretical framework. It will then provide 
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background information on Tunisia and Yemen’s post-Arab Spring political 
trajectories, and lastly, it will apply Jenson’s model to both countries’ social 
cohesion efforts through national dialogue.
Jenson’s model on social cohesion
Within policy and academic spheres, social cohesion is an increasingly 
recurring concept. Two traditions of study of the concept have emerged, 
the first within the social sciences, particularly sociology and social 
psychology. Some of the key texts that have emerged from this tradition 
have been written by Berger (1998), Gough and Olofsson (1999), 
Lockwood (1999) and Bollen and Hoyle (2001). The second tradition, from 
within the policy discourse on social cohesion, has yielded key studies 
commissioned by various government and non-governmental entities, 
from the Canadian government, to the World Bank, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the African Union. 
However, the literature in English on social cohesion in the MENA region 
is practically non-existent, despite the fact that several of the region’s states 
already have or will have to undertake social cohesion projects in the wake 
of the Arab Spring revolutions. This article therefore fills a gap in the 
literature on the concept of social cohesion.
In order to unpack the concept, Jane Jenson’s paper (1998:16-17) on the 
topic, which followed a Canadian Policy Research Networks Roundtable on 
Mapping Social Cohesion in December 1997, is used in this article. Having 
reviewed literature on social cohesion produced by the governments 
of Canada and France as well as the OECD and the Club of Rome, 
Jenson extracted five key components which are generally considered to 
characterise cohesive societies. She also presented these in contrast to 
components which characterise societies which lack cohesion. Although 
Jenson’s model is based on a limited snapshot of the literature available on 
social cohesion and includes analyses from countries such as France whose 
social cohesion efforts are imperfect and ongoing, it remains one of the 
most comprehensive studies on the subject and provides a useful summary 
of the conclusions reached by very serious studies.
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The five dimensions of Jenson’s model on social cohesion are: 1) Belonging 
v. Isolation, 2) Inclusion v. Exclusion, 3) Participation v. Non-Involvement, 
4) Recognition v. Rejection and 5) Legitimacy v. Illegitimacy. The first 
dimension refers to the existence of shared values and a sense of common 
identity. According to the Canadian government’s Policy Research Sub-
Committee, a cohesive society is one in which citizens ‘share values’ 
(Jenson 1998:15). As for the OECD, it highlights the importance of a 
shared sense of identity for citizens to feel ‘committed’ to their society, 
and ‘part of the same community’ (Jenson 1998:15). On the other hand, 
threats to social cohesion are associated with feelings of isolation from 
the community. The second dimension refers to the economic inclusion 
of citizens within a society. This dimension highlights the importance 
of access to economic markets by all, as those who are economically 
marginalised might consequently feel excluded from society. The third 
dimension focuses on people’s political participation at both the central and 
the local levels of government. Literature coming out of France has indeed 
highlighted the importance of political participation at all levels, including 
the local. On the other hand, non-involvement is considered a threat to 
social cohesion. The fourth dimension concerns the respect for difference 
and tolerance for diversity in a society. Recognition of difference is a core 
component of a cohesive society. The government of France highlighted the 
importance of citizens feeling that others within their country accepted 
them and recognised their contributions to society. By contrast, rejection 
of difference, or efforts to foster excessive unanimity, are likely to make 
societies less cohesive. The final dimension refers to the maintenance 
of legitimacy of major political institutions, the state in particular, as 
mediators among individuals of different interests. According to the Club 
of Rome, social cohesion depends on maintaining the legitimacy of those 
institutions so that they may continue to act as mediators in society.
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Tunisia since the Arab Spring
After Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s ousting, elections to determine the 
composition of the National Constituent Assembly took place in October 
2011. The Islamist political party Ennahda won the elections, though only 
with 37 percent of the vote. This forced it to share power with two secular 
parties in what became known as ‘the Troika’ government. This power-
sharing arrangement caused unending squabbles over a new Constitution 
inside the Constituent Assembly. Ennahda’s 89 delegates (out of a total of 
217) were felt to be pressing their religious agenda, and political wrangling 
ensued, which postponed the preparation of the Constitution (Ottaway 
2013:2).
Soon after the assassination of the opposition figure Mohammed Brahmi 
on 25 July 2013, the tensions between opposition parties and the ruling 
Troika turned into a grave political crisis. Popular protests also followed, 
which strongly destabilised the Troika, and Ennahda in particular. In an 
attempt to smooth over the conf lict, the Tunisian General Labour Union 
(UGTT), together with UTICA (the employers’ union), the Tunisian League 
for Human Rights (LTDH), and the National Bar Association initiated 
a series of indirect shuttle negotiations between the opposition and the 
Troika to overcome the political crisis (Salah 2013).
The Tunisian national dialogue then began in earnest. Tunisian politicians 
were in agreement about what needed to be done in order to complete 
the stalled transition: approve the Constitution; form a new politically-
neutral transitional government to lead the country until the elections; 
and set up a new independent body to supervise the parliamentary and 
presidential elections. However, the politicians disagreed profoundly about 
the sequencing and timing of the steps for reasons of political strategy 
(Ottaway 2013). Ennahda insisted that the Troika government would not 
resign until the Constitution was approved, the election commission and 
the election law were ready, and the election dates firmly set. The opposition 
parties, on the other hand, wanted to follow the roadmap proposed by the 
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quartet of mediators. The roadmap called for the formation of the election 
commission in two weeks and the writing of the election law within two 
weeks of the beginning of the final negotiations of the national dialogue, 
the resignation of the government within three weeks, and the completion 
of the Constitution and establishment of the elections’ dates within 
four weeks. Ennahda feared that once the government had resigned, the 
opposition would stall on the Constitution and election dates. Indeed, 
members of the opposition were openly saying that elections should be 
postponed long enough to give time to the new government to get rid of 
Ennahda’s appointees in bureaucratic positions (Ottaway 2013).
After many delays, and facing a ‘final’ deadline before mass protests, a 
bare majority (eleven out of twenty-one) of the dialogue's participating 
political parties chose Mehdi Jomaa as the new Prime Minister to lead a 
caretaker government to oversee a transition period until the adoption of 
a new Constitution and electoral law, and the holding of parliamentary 
and presidential elections. Ennahda was lauded as being the first Islamist 
party to willingly and peacefully step down from power. Tunisia also 
succeeded in adopting a new Constitution. On 26 January 2014, just over 
92 percent of members of the National Constituent Assembly voted in 
favour of the Constitution. On 2 November, parliamentary elections took 
place peacefully, which Ennahda did not win (the Nidaa Tounes party won 
a majority of seats), and in December of the same year, Nidaa Tounes’s 
candidate Beji Caid Essebsi was elected president, thereby cementing the 
country’s transition to a non-Islamist-dominated government.
Yemen since the Arab Spring
Following Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen was rocked by the Arab Spring 
in January 2011 and has not managed to transition to a democratic and 
peaceful state. Popular protests to topple President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who 
had been in power for thirty-three years, began in January 2011. Eventually, 
Saleh was forced to agree to a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered 
deal to hand over power in April 2011. However, he refused to sign it until 
November 2011.
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The GCC deal specified that Saleh leave office in thirty days and make 
way for his Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi in return for full 
immunity from prosecution for Saleh. Hadi was to form and preside 
over a Government of National Unity which would govern the country 
before presidential elections took place within ninety days. The deal also 
established a two-year transitional period during which the military and 
security institutions were to be restructured and a national dialogue 
would be convened to prepare the ground for new elections to be held by 
February 2014. According to the GCC agreement, the national dialogue 
was to provide an opportunity for representatives from all walks of Yemeni 
society to voice their concerns and stances, including women and youth 
groups, the Southern and Houthi movements and other political parties 
and civil society representatives. A Preparation Committee of twenty-five 
members, including women and youth, was formed in July 2012 and started 
working in August to prepare the national dialogue (Lackner 2012).
The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) began in March 2013 and 
after setbacks and delays, approved a draft containing nearly 1800 
recommendations in January 2014. In February of the same year, a small 
presidential panel controversially decided that Yemen should be divided 
into a federation of six regions, causing concern among the northern Shi’a 
Houthi movement (Gaston 2014:3-4). President Hadi also controversially 
announced the passing of a fuel price rise, which led to anti-government 
protests. The Houthi movement rode this wave of protests to the capital 
and eventually applied such pressure on Hadi and his cabinet that he 
resigned (International Crisis Group 2014a). Although he later rescinded 
his resignation, the Houthi leadership seized power and chased Hadi out of 
the country. A Saudi-led coalition of states launched air strikes against the 
Shi’a Houthi movement in support of Hadi, and there is now concern over 
the internationalisation of the Yemen conf lict along sectarian lines, with 
Saudi Arabia supporting the Sunni transitional government and Iran the 
Shi’a Houthi movement (BBC 2015).
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Applying Jenson’s model to Tunisia and Yemen
Jenson’ model is a useful tool to assess the level of social cohesion brought 
about by the national dialogues in Tunisia and Yemen. Although both 
countries have spent considerable resources and effort to ensure that 
their national dialogues led to more cohesive societies, Tunisia has seen 
greater success in bringing about that result. Yet Yemen’s national dialogue 
was one of the most inclusive and democratic processes the country had 
ever seen. As it was under way, the UN’s Special Envoy to Yemen Jamal 
Benomar reported to the Security Council that Yemen’s National Dialogue 
was making ‘extraordinary progress’ (Kasinof 2015). The national dialogue 
was carried out over 10 months to ensure that a wide range of issues was 
covered to a satisfactory standard. Five hundred and sixty-five delegates 
took part in the dialogue, including an unprecedented number of youth, 
women and civil society activists (Gaston 2014:3). It also included 
representatives who had never been allowed to engage in the country’s 
main political discussions, namely the Houthis and representatives from 
the southern separatist movement Al Hirak. The fact that these new actors 
were invited to engage on an equal footing with the main political parties 
and tribal leaders was very significant. Furthermore, the delegates were 
required to carry out significant public outreach efforts to seek input 
from their constituencies in Sana’a and beyond. In the end, the National 
Dialogue Conference issued nearly 1800 recommendations, ranging from 
maintaining a 30 per cent quota for women in all government positions 
to restructuring the military and security apparatus (Gaston 2014:8). 
These recommendations should have gone a long way towards meeting the 
popular demands of the Arab Spring revolutionaries; yet within months 
of the closing of the NDC, the Houthi movement had taken over Sana’a, 
leading to a Saudi-dominated military operation in the country. Yemen is 
now in the throes of a raging conf lict, a grave humanitarian situation and 
a plummeting economy. How did its national dialogue fail to foster social 
cohesion, despite promising signs, and how did Tunisia’s fair better? 
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Box 1







Jenson’s first component ‘Belonging’, refers to the existence of a widely 
shared sense of commitment to a society. Did the national dialogues in 
Tunisia and Yemen foster this sense of common identity and commitment 
to the unity of their respective countries? In the case of Tunisia, 
although prior to the national dialogue the country was embroiled in a 
political quagmire, the issue of belonging was never a predominant one. 
The country was indeed split along political lines, where Islamists and 
Liberals clashed over political predominance in the country’s local and 
national institutions, so that they might inf luence key moments in Tunisia’s 
modern history, such as the drafting of the Constitution and elections. 
However, despite their political and ideological differences, particularly 
with regard to the role of religion in society, none of the opposing parties 
claimed a sense of isolation. Participants in the national dialogue, whether 
they represented Ennahda or Nidaa Tounes, shared a sense of belonging to 
their country and a feeling of commitment to their society. The national 
dialogue was, in fact, seen by all as an opportunity to peacefully re-establish 
order in a country which prided itself on being the original and most pacific 
of the Arab Spring countries. 
In contrast, Yemen is a country that faces a secessionist threat from the 
South. The national dialogue did not stumble on issues pertaining to 
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the democratisation of the country in the wake of a long dictatorship. 
Participants involved in the discussions on, among others, State building, 
Good Governance, Rights and Freedoms and the Role of the Armed and 
Security Forces, did not face major roadblocks and were able to conclude 
their work promptly by the September 18th 2013 deadline. The topic which 
slowed down the dialogue was the southern issue, as the sessions on this 
issue were delayed by a boycott by southern delegates in August 2013 over 
the independence of southern Yemen. 
The issue of southern Yemen’s belonging to Yemen dates back several 
decades. From 1967 to 1990, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (or 
South Yemen) existed as an independent state. While South Yemen and its 
northern neighbour, the Yemen Arab Republic (or North Yemen), united 
to create the modern-day Republic of Yemen in 1990, tensions between the 
two regions continued to arise. As part of the new unity government, it was 
agreed that South Yemen’s president, Ali Salim al-Beidh, would become 
the unified country’s vice president, while North Yemen’s president, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, would become president of the new republic. Within two 
years of this new arrangement, al-Beidh returned to the former southern 
capital in protest over the perceived political and economic marginalisation 
of the south. This bled into a civil war for independence in 1994 which the 
North won, and in which the North subsequently strengthened its grip over 
a bitter South. Grievances over the northern elites’ access to southern land 
and natural resources, which contrasted with the rampant unemployment 
faced by southerners, nourished the rebirth of the southern secessionist 
movement in 2007 (Reardon 2014).
These tensions arose during the national dialogue and were not dealt with 
definitively in its sessions, leaving the southern issue unsettled and open 
to a relapse. It is in fact very likely that the only reason the southern issue 
has been pushed to the background is because the Houthi issue came to the 
forefront so explosively. During the national dialogue, the subcommittee 
investigating the structure of the state became an arena for disputes related 
to the southern issue. The southerners from the Al Hirak movement 
participating in the national dialogue insisted that the state be a federal 
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one composed of two states formed from the territories of the former 
Yemen Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen in the south, while other southerners and northerners rejected this 
proposal on the basis that it would allow the former south to reconstitute 
itself, and instead proposed a five or six state federation.
Demonstrations in the south renouncing the dialogue and calling for 
secession drew large crowds. The UN tried to build support in the south 
for the dialogue. For instance, a committee was formed to address the issue 
of the pensions and employment of those in the southern bureaucracy and 
military who were dismissed after the 1994 war, and another committee 
was charged with resolving the issue of land and property in the south 
(Schmitz 2014a). In addition, Hadi announced the creation of a trust to 
compensate those hurt in the south during the last two decades of Saleh’s 
rule (Schmitz 2014a). However, in August 2013, southern representatives 
within the NDC boycotted the remaining sessions unless their demands 
over the southern issue were met. In September, a sixteen-person 
subcommittee of representatives from the north and south, known as 
the North-South Committee, was formed. After months of negotiations, 
this committee brokered an agreement which avoided southern secession 
by agreeing that Yemen would become a federal state with greater local 
autonomy (Gaston 2014:3–4). The number of regions within the federation 
was not decided, as a proposal for a six-region solution was not accepted at 
the NDC level. However, a few weeks after the NDC wrapped up its work, 
a special committee hand-selected and led by President Hadi announced 
that it had agreed upon six regions, two in the south and four in the north 
(Gaston 2014:3–4). Hadi’s heavy-handed solo approach to this complex 
issue fostered resentment and rejection among key southern as well as 
Houthi leaders. In wishing to tackle this pending issue, which could not 
be resolved without considerably more time and resources being injected 
into the already delayed National Dialogue Conference, Hadi opened the 
dialogue to failure, as the Houthis allegedly moved to Sana’a in reaction to 




The second dimension of Jenson’s model refers to the economic inclusion 
of citizens within a society. Seeing that the Arab Spring revolutions were 
in equal parts driven by political and economic grievances, the economic 
inclusion of the revolutionaries was and remains an extremely important 
key to social cohesion. In Tunisia, economic factors pushed the dialogue 
participants to negotiate with each other to resolve the political quagmire. 
Indeed, the international community was able to apply economic pressures 
on the participants to ensure their active participation in resolving the 
country’s political woes. The African Development Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank froze their loans to the country, 
making the f low of funds conditional on economic reforms and on a 
resolution to the political crisis. Some Gulf countries such as Kuwait 
and the United Arab Emirates are also believed to have applied economic 
pressures on the country so that Ennahda would exit the government. The 
government of Algeria, which Tunisia depends on economically, also made 
it clear that it would stop its economic and security collaboration with 
Tunisia if a consensus was not reached among the political parties involved 
in the dialogue (International Crisis Group 2014b:6). Similarly, tourism 
is a pillar of the Tunisian economy, and the sector was heavily impacted 
upon by the revolution in 2011. The number of visitors to the country 
dropped from 6.9 to 4.8 million visitors between 2010 and 2011 (Tunisian 
Ministry of Tourism 2015), and the dialogue participants were keenly 
aware of the potential loss of revenue a prolonged political crisis could cost 
the country. As a small country with little in terms of natural resources, 
Tunisia is dependent on foreign investment and tourism. Its reputation as 
a peaceful and stable country is therefore very important to keeping its 
economy af loat, and the dialogue participants were aware that prolonging 
the political crisis was not an option for the country. The national dialogue 
was therefore undertaken in a fairly short period of time – six months – to 
avoid, among other things, dragging the economy down any further.
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In Yemen, on the other hand, analysts have pointed out that one of the 
biggest f laws of the national dialogue was to overlook ‘bread and butter’ 
issues which regular citizens were facing while the dialogue was taking 
place. In the words of Charles Schmitz (2014b): ‘The National Dialogue 
Conference produced a document and vision of just government in Yemen, 
but while the intellectual elites were worried about the semantics of the 
document, Hadi’s government did not govern. The economy worsened 
(as expected due to the fall in oil production) and security worsened, and 
the government had no response. The international community urged 
good governance, which gave little solace to those facing increasingly 
dire material circumstances’. Rather than face the growing poverty, those 
who could emigrate, did so, to avoid the near 50% unemployment rate 
(Naylor 2015). For those who could not emigrate, as the 10-month long 
dialogue dragged on, resentment grew towards the dialogue participants, 
who earned a rumoured 125 to 200 dollars in per diems (Gaston 2014:8). 
This discrepancy between the economic troubles of regular citizens and the 
position of privilege of dialogue participants created a disconnection with 
the national dialogue. According to the United States Institute of Peace: 
‘to its worst critics, the NDC has been a costly political sideshow that has 
distracted political energy and attention at a critical period in Yemen’s 
transition’ (Gaston 2014:8) towards secondary issues which do not put 
food on the table.
Additionally, in the wake of the national dialogue, the government decided 
to lift fuel subsidies in July 2014, and this proved too much for the system to 
bear. Having spent about 3 billion dollars on fuel subsidies, nearly a third 
of the state’s revenues, the previous year, and with bankruptcy looming, 
the Hadi government attempted to raise fuel prices in an effort to rein in its 
budget deficit and conclude talks with the IMF for the country to receive a 
560 million dollar loan from the organisation (Ghobari 2014; International 
Crisis Group 2015:3). The Houthis, who had never trusted the transitional 
government, took advantage of the situation by organising demonstrations 
demanding a reinstatement of subsidies, a new government, and a swift 
implementation of NDC agreements. Although the Houthis did not 
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represent the bulk of Yemeni society, their demands resonated widely and 
far beyond their core support base because of the country’s dire economic 
straits, thereby opening the door for the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, Hadi’s 
escape to Saudi Arabia, and the current conf lict in the country.
Finally, it is worth noting the role of spoilers in bringing about the current 
breakdown in social cohesion in Yemen. The GCC-brokered deal did not 
force Saleh into exile or curb his participation in national politics through 
his party, the General People’s Congress (GPC). He therefore remained 
in the country to undermine the national dialogue as he plotted his own 
return to politics. It is widely known that Saleh and the Houthis have 
concluded a marriage of convenience, which has allied their forces long 
enough to topple Hadi’s transitional government and rid them of common 
enemies.1 According to the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar 
Saleh, who remains well connected and supported in the country, has also 
been behind the sabotage of electrical grids and oil pipelines by renegade 
tribesmen in the country, which resulted in Sana’a being without fuel or 
electricity for days in June 2014. In reaction, mass protests were organised 
on the 11th June calling for the overthrow of the Hadi government (Schmitz 
2014a; International Crisis Group 2014c). The economy is therefore a key 
component which determines the success or failure of social cohesion 
efforts, and paying close attention to economic grievances is absolutely 
crucial to ensure that spoilers do not hijack attempts at peacebuilding.
Participation
The third dimension of Jenson’s model on social cohesion focuses on 
people’s political participation at both the central and the local levels 
of government. In the case of Tunisia, political participation was at the 
heart of the tensions between Ennahda and the opposition parties. In the 
October 2011 Parliamentary elections, Ennahda won with 37 per cent of 
1 These common foes include General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who combated the Houthis 
during Saleh’s reign, and turned against Saleh during the revolution, as well as members 
of the opposition Islamist Islah party and the powerful Hashid tribal federation, which are 
led by brothers and have clashed with the Houthis and opposed Saleh’s plans to have his 
son succeed him in power.
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the vote. This meant that although it was the clear winner, a large portion 
of the electorate did not feel represented by the party. Fear of an Islamist 
political takeover was shared by many liberals, particularly in light of what 
was perceived as Ennahda’s strategy to place its men and women at all 
levels of the political echelons. According to the opposition, during the two 
years that it was leading the Troika, Ennahda placed close to 2000 Islamists 
in positions of power in local, regional and central administrations 
(International Crisis Group 2014b:9). It was feared that Ennahda intended 
to use these well-placed loyalists to secure successes in the country’s future 
elections. These political appointees could allegedly do this by offering 
jobs, promotions within the civil service, a helping hand to get to the top of 
waiting lists for cheap state housing and free healthcare to those who voted 
for Ennahda (International Crisis Group 2014b:9).
For a large portion of the Tunisian people, the national dialogue was 
intended to bring more political balance to the country. As for Ennahda, 
the level of wariness it faced within the National Constituent Assembly and 
beyond led it to decide that its best option was to compromise during the 
national dialogue and agree to hand over power to a technocratic interim 
government which would oversee the country’s 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Analysts generally concur that Ennahda agreed to 
this out of self-preservation (International Crisis Group 2014d:7). Indeed, 
since the 2013 ouster of President Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, Ennahda 
became aware of the risks it ran if it alienated large segments of the 
political spectrum and was seen to govern single-handedly. The Ennahda 
leadership therefore instructed its base to strengthen the party’s reputation 
within the political, business and media spheres through conciliation 
and compromise. In light of the regional climate of tension towards 
Islamist parties, Ennahda leaders feared a repeat of the persecution the 
party faced in the early 1990s after it obtained 20 to 25 per cent of the 
vote in the country’s April 1989 legislative elections. Ennahda’s leader 
Rached Ghannouchi is quoted as saying that: ‘We must accept to negotiate 
with forces that are hostile to us, otherwise we risk returning to jail or 
being exiled again’ (International Crisis Group 2014d:7). Regardless of its 
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motives, Ennahda’s willingness to step down from power at the outcome of 
the national dialogue preserved social cohesion in the country. Although 
the party did not win the parliamentary and presidential elections which 
followed the national dialogue, Ennahda may very well have prepared the 
terrain for future wins by proving that it respected the values of democracy 
and was willing and able to compromise.
In Yemen, political participation proved to be a sticking point for the national 
dialogue. Southern participation in the dialogue was a point of contention 
during the planning stage. Despite the mandate that half of the dialogue 
delegates come from the South, most of the Al Hirak leadership refused 
to participate in the NDC from the beginning, particularly those with 
secessionist views. Those southerners who did participate had personal ties 
with Hadi and were therefore not representative of the full range of positions 
in the South. They also did not possess sufficient political clout to enforce 
the NDC’s decisions in the South. This made it difficult for the NDC to be 
the platform where the southern issue could be resolved definitively. Indeed, 
Al Hirak members who were not represented in the NDC were reportedly 
expecting the dialogue to fail and waiting for their chance to escalate their 
independence campaign through protests, regardless of NDC decisions. It 
was estimated that this chance would occur during the referendum over the 
country’s new Constitution, at which time they planned to launch a boycott 
and possibly turn to violence (Gaston 2014:5).
Unlike the southern delegation, the Houthi movement’s participation in 
the dialogue seemed unproblematic. After rejecting the GCC Initiative 
and Hadi’s replacement of Saleh during the transitional period, by 2013, 
the movement actively participated in the national dialogue, seemingly 
belatedly endorsing the GCC Initiative. The national dialogue’s sub-
committee on the Sa’ada conf lict, in which the Houthi movement controlled 
the governorate of Sa’ada and parts of the surrounding governorates 
of al-Jawf, Amran and Hajjah, easily produced a report endorsed by the 
Houthis which called for: freedom of thought and worship for all sects, good 
governance and economic development, a prohibition against receiving 
foreign support, the prevention of the military from being used in internal 
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political struggles, and the disarming of militias (Schmitz 2014a). The fact 
that the Houthis agreed to the prohibition against receiving foreign support 
and the disarming of militias when they are an Iran-backed militia was 
taken as a positive step during the dialogue. However, the Houthis’ strategy 
seemed to be to undermine the dialogue while actively participating in it. 
While the Houthis had 35 delegates in the NDC, they continued to wage 
battles in the North, in Sa’ada and different provinces around it, fighting 
with tribes allied to the Islah party, Yemen’s most inf luential Islamist 
party, and with Salafi groups (Al-Muslimi 2014). The Houthi leadership 
argued that its target was not the Yemeni state, but rather Salafi groups 
which it has fought for decades, leaders of the Islah party and General Ali 
Mohsen al-Ahmar, who headed the wars waged by President Saleh against 
the Houthis. However, the movement’s efforts to undermine the national 
dialogue in the north were warning signs that the Houthis were determined 
to shape the country’s political map through armed conf lict. Although the 
Houthi takeover of Sana’a surprised many, the writing was on the wall from 
the early days of the national dialogue.
Recognition
The fourth dimension of Jenson’s model on social cohesion concerns the 
respect for difference and tolerance of diversity in a society. In the case of 
Tunisia, the country’s Constitution illustrates how the national dialogue 
fostered a respect for difference and tolerance for diversity in the country. 
Approving the Constitution was one of the three processes that the dialogue 
participants had to work on, along with choosing a new consensual interim 
Prime Minister to prepare the country’s 2014 elections and establishing 
a new independent body to supervise the elections. The Constitution is 
therefore a direct product of the national dialogue and was one of the 
markers of its success.
Indeed, the text of the Constitution was lauded by analysts and 
international policymakers alike as one of the most democratic and liberal 
in the Arab world. The Constitution quieted the fears that Tunisians, and 
in particular Tunisian women, might lose their gains under the watch of 
28
Hannah Hamidi
an Islamist-dominated National Constituent Assembly. The Constitution 
stipulates that Islam is the state religion, but that Tunisia is a civil state 
based on citizenship and the rule of law, meaning that Sharia law is not 
the main source of legislation in the country. An article ratified in the 
new Constitution establishes freedom of conscience in the country. This 
allows individuals to freely practice any religion, or no religion at all. 
Additionally, although Ennahda MPs had proposed declaring that women 
are ‘complementary’ to men, this formulation was not approved in the final 
draft. Instead, the Constitution introduces a number of elements that will 
be crucial for women’s rights in the future. Article 46 specifically provides 
that the state must work to achieve ‘parity between men and women in 
elected assemblies’ (Al-Ali and Ben Romdhane 2014; Al-Sheikh 2014). 
Gender sensitive wording also peppered the entire Constitution. Article 40 
states that the right to work is ‘a right for every citizen, male and female’ 
(Al-Ali and Ben Romdhane 2014; Al-Sheikh 2014). Gender sensitive 
wording is also used regarding the right to decent working conditions, to a 
fair wage and to stand for election. Indeed, Article 73 provides that ‘every 
male and female voter’ has the right to stand for election for the position 
of President of the Republic (Al-Ali and Ben Romdhane 2014; Al-Sheikh 
2014). The Constitution therefore turns the page on any divisiveness 
within Tunisian society and promotes social cohesion through the respect 
of diversity.
In the case of Yemen, this article has covered the secessionist movement 
in the south in the section on Belonging. This movement represents 
segments of the southern population who do not feel committed to a united 
Yemen state. On the other hand, the Houthi problem in Yemen is based 
on sectarian/religious grievances, whereby the Houthis do not necessarily 
want to secede, but do not feel that their religious beliefs are accepted 
and respected by Sana’a. Tolerance for the Houthis’ differences has not 
existed throughout the country’s history. Indeed, Zaydism, the Shi’a sect 
of Islam which the Houthis follow, was severely repressed prior to the 1990 
unification of both Yemens by the authorities of the Yemen Arab Republic, 
who followed the Sunni branch of Islam. Saudi Arabia also saw the Houthis 
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as a threat at its border, and by the 1970s, it began to fund a Salafi Wahhabi 
group in northern Yemen to convert Shi’a Zaydi locals to Wahhabism 
(Sunni Islam). By the 1990s, the Salafis had become powerful in the area, 
which made then President Saleh fearful of their increasing inf luence. 
Saleh decided to temper this inf luence by supporting the Houthis, letting 
the group’s leader, Hussein al-Houthi, run for parliament in Saleh’s ruling 
party (Al-Muslimi 2014). Hussein al-Houthi served in Parliament but soon 
abandoned politics to focus on the promotion of Zaydism in the North. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s he launched Zaydi religious education 
and summer camp programmes for the young, largely in reaction to the 
continued use of these same measures by Salafi and Wahhabi organisations 
in the North. As repression against Zaydism also continued, he militarised 
the movement, urging members to purchase weapons to defend themselves 
(Schmitz 2012).
When the Saleh regime endorsed the Bush administration’s War on 
Terror and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Hussein al-Houthi saw an 
opportunity to broaden the appeal of his movement by attacking Saleh’s 
alliance with the United States.  Saleh responded to this provocation by 
ordering Hussein’s arrest. Hussein’s supporters clashed with government 
forces to resist Hussein’s arrest, and this quickly metamorphosed into an 
armed conf lict in Sa’ada in the summer of 2004. Hussein was killed at the 
end of this first war in the fall of 2004, but Hussein’s father, Badr al-Din 
al-Houthi, and his brother, Abd Malik al-Houthi, assumed leadership and 
refused to compromise with Saleh.  Five more wars ensued before Saleh 
was toppled by the Arab Spring revolution in the country (Schmitz 2012, 
2014c; Al-Muslimi 2014). By the time the national dialogue came, the 
Houthis were distrustful of the central government because of their history 
with it. As will be seen in the following section, the Hadi government was 
also perceived as an extension of the Saleh regime which persecuted the 




The final dimension of Jenson’s model on social cohesion refers to the 
importance of legitimacy for major political institutions serving as 
mediators among individuals of different interests. In the case of Tunisia, the 
mediators of the national dialogue played a key role in its success. The fact 
that the mediators, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), UTICA 
(the employers’ union), the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) 
and the National Bar Association, were not state institutions but fairly 
independent, respected and powerful civil society organisations certainly 
aided the process. The UGTT for instance, is the largest conglomeration of 
affiliated trade unions, which boasts 400 000 members across the country 
(International Crisis Group 2014b:3). It has often played an important role 
in key political events in Tunisia’s history, including in the country’s fight 
for independence from France in the 1950s and more recently during the 
Jasmine Revolution.2 This has given it moral authority in the country, as it 
is perceived as having been a force for good in the country’s recent history. 
Due to the presence within its ranks of individuals from all walks of the 
political spectrum, it was also perceived as a fairly unbiased mediator, 
as opposing political allegiances within the organisation cancelled each 
other out. Indeed, while the more anti-Islamist and leftist members of the 
union were inclined to endorse and push the secular opposition’s agenda, 
the union’s more centrist members resisted this. One example of this 
dynamic was the union’s refusal to endorse the opposition’s call for the 
dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly, which was dominated 
by Ennahda (International Crisis Group 2014b:4). The combined inf luence 
over Tunisian society of these civil society organisations made this 
mediating team difficult to ignore during the national dialogue. It was 
therefore able to exert considerable inf luence over the proceedings, and 
the UGTT’s Secretary-General was able to direct and shape the debates, 
allegedly forcing the participants to remain in the room until satisfactory 
decisions were reached (International Crisis Group 2014b:4). It is therefore 
2 The name given to Tunisia’s 2010–2011 revolution to topple President Ben Ali.
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possible to state that the success of Tunisia’s national dialogue was in large 
part due to the mediating team’s considerable leverage over the dialogue’s 
participants and its legitimacy in their eyes.
In the case of Yemen, no independent mediator was appointed to oversee 
the national dialogue, and it was organised and run by the transitional 
government. Problematically, the transitional government was not 
endorsed by all factions of Yemeni society, particularly the Houthis. Indeed, 
the Houthis publicly rejected the GCC initiative that removed Saleh from 
power, even though it achieved their goal of ousting the president. They 
believed the GCC initiative to be a conspiracy by Saudi Arabia and the 
United States to hijack Yemen’s revolution. Because many of Yemen’s elite, 
particularly Saleh’s party, the GPC, were unaffected under the initiative, 
the Houthis felt that more change was needed and that all should step down 
in order for Yemen to forge a new path. After Saleh’s vice-president, Abd 
Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, was brought to power, the Houthis continued to 
protest, although other political groups had stopped (Al-Muslimi 2014). 
There was therefore distrust between the Houthis and Hadi from the 
beginning of the transition process, as Hadi was seen as an extension of 
the Saleh regime which had persecuted the Houthis.3 More generally, the 
transitional government was made up of a cabinet split evenly between 
members of Saleh’s party and the opposition party the Mustarak, and a 
parliament which was dominated by Saleh’s party. The Houthis argued that 
with such leadership, as temporary as it was, the revolution was incomplete, 
and these remnants of the old regime would eventually turn on the Houthis 
as had happened in the past. 
As the dialogue came to an end and Hadi proposed a 6-state federation 
for the country, the Houthis descended upon Sana’a and proceeded to 
undermine Hadi and his government. In January 2015, they kidnapped 
3 As mentioned above, the Houthis were however not unwilling to conclude a marriage of 
convenience with Saleh himself, despite having participated in his downfall. It is generally 
held that this alliance was meant to be short-lived and that both sides would end up 




Hadi’s chief of staff, sacked the presidential palace and placed the president 
and government ministers under house arrest. After Hadi escaped from his 
house arrest and f led to the south, the Houthis pursued him, which pushed 
him to f lee the country altogether. 
Following Hadi’s escape from house arrest, the Houthi Supreme 
Revolutionary Committee, the group’s 15-member governing body, issued 
a statement via the state-run Saba News Agency declaring Hadi a fugitive 
who: ‘lost any legitimacy as president after his reckless actions undermined 
the security, stability and economy of the country’ (Al-Moshki 2015). 
Although the Houthis participated in the national dialogue, the legitimacy 
of the Hadi government seems to always have been an underlying issue for 
them, and they seized the first opportunity to topple him. This unravelled 
the fragile social cohesion achieved by the national dialogue, as Hadi 
loyalists, an international coalition headed by Saudi Arabia and other 
Houthi enemies have resisted the Houthi takeover. 
Conclusion
This article has sought to compare the post-Arab Spring social cohesion 
efforts of Tunisia and Yemen through their respective national dialogues. 
It has employed Jane Jenson’s model on social cohesion to break down 
the comparative analysis into five components which characterise social 
cohesion. In doing so, it has explained why Tunisia’s social cohesion 
efforts have seen greater success than Yemen’s. It has found that while 
Yemen struggled with the demands of a secessionist movement during the 
national dialogue, Tunisian dialogue participants were more committed 
to their country’s unity, making the dialogue much more feasible in 
the latter case. Realising the risks of a prolonged political crisis on the 
country’s economy, Tunisian politicians decided to negotiate with each 
other to avoid an economic meltdown. In Yemen, however, the transitional 
government’s lack of interest in the economy hijacked the achievements 
of the national dialogue, as the state of the economy was manipulated by 
spoilers to weaken social cohesion. At the height of the political crisis in 
Tunisia, the Ennahda party was willing to step down from power to restore 
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an acclaimed balance in political participation, while in Yemen, both the 
Southern and Houthi participation in the national dialogue masked hidden 
agendas which undermined the country’s social cohesion. While Tunisia’s 
national dialogue allowed it to usher in the future by passing a Constitution 
which guaranteed tolerance for diversity in the country, Yemen’s history of 
rejection of the Houthis came back to haunt the national dialogue, as the 
movement was unwilling to trust the government’s initiative and reverted 
to its traditional aggressive stance towards Sana’a. And finally, whereas 
Tunisia’s dialogue was organised by respected independent mediators, 
Yemen’s was not overseen by mediators and was instead organised by the 
very authorities which the Houthis mistrusted and viewed as illegitimate. 
Key lessons learned emerge from Tunisia and Yemen’s national dialogues 
which are worth considering by countries in similar transitional phases: 
the grievances of secessionist movements should in some cases be addressed 
separately prior to engaging in a national dialogue, as their demands can 
hijack national dialogues which are meant to cover all of a society’s woes; 
the economy should be revitalised at the same time as the dialogue is 
taking place; spoilers, whose participation in national dialogues can hide 
ulterior motives, should be minded; national dialogues should assuage the 
fears of all participants and their constituencies by fostering tolerance for 
diversity within a society; and national dialogues should be overseen by an 
authority which is deemed legitimate by all participants. Although this is 
by no means an exhaustive list of the requirements for a successful national 
dialogue, recent history shows us that these are core elements which should 
not be overlooked when carrying out social cohesion efforts.
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